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[*1]
Frischer v Goldner
2022 NY Slip Op 51060(U)
Decided on October 12, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Golden, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected in part through October 31, 2022; it will not be published in the printed
Official Reports.

Decided on October 12, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Muriel L. Frischer, PetitionerLandlord,
against
Paul C. Goldner, RespondentTenant,
"John Doe" and "Jane Doe," RespondentsUndertenants.

Index No. LT30004122/KI
Counsel for Petitioner: Daniel Patrick Phillips, Belkin Burden Goldman LLP
Counsel for Respondent: Stephanie Del Toro, Riseboro Community Partnership/LEAP
Tashanna B. Golden, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this
petitioner's motion:
Papers Numbers
Petitioner's Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support 9, 10
Respondent's Notice of Cross Motion 13
Respondent's Affidavits/Affirmations in Support and Exhibits 1417
Petitioner's Affirmation in Opposition and Exhibits 1820

Court File passim
Before this court is Petitioner's motion to vacate the Emergency Rental Assistance
Program ("ERAP") stay and to restore the case to the calendar; and Respondent's Cross
Motion requesting a denial of Petitioner's motion to vacate the ERAP stay or in the
alternative to dismiss based on Petitioner's alleged failure to properly serve the predicate
notice.

Applicability of the ERAP Stay:
The Court must first deal with the Petitioner's request to vacate the ERAP stay. If the
Court finds that it will not vacate the stay, the Crossmotion cannot be heard. Petitioner seeks
to vacate the automatic stay on the grounds that a decision has been rendered and therefore
the stay is no longer appropriate. Submission of an application for ERAP has the effect of
staying "all proceedings pending a determination of eligibility" (emphasis added). L 2021,
c56, part BB, [*2]subpart A, § 8, as amended by L 2021, c 417, part A, § 4). Courts have
found it appropriate to set aside an ERAP stay where there is a provisional approval, See
Park Tower South Company LLC, v Simons, 75 Misc 3d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.3d 342, 2022 NY
Misc. LEXIS 2706, 2022 NY Slip Op 22192, 2022 WL 2253641, so where, as here, there is a
denial, the ERAP stay is no longer appropriate. However, in the Notice of CrossMotion, the
Respondent in his affidavit states that he has appealed the denial of the ERAP application. J.
Marks Administrative Order 34/22 dated January 16, 2002 in Paragraph 5 states that
"eviction matters where there is a pending ERAP application shall be stayed until a final
determination of eligibility... including appeals." J. Marks AO/34/22. Respondent has failed
to attach any proof of the appeal but states that it was filed over seven months ago, "on or
about March 8, 2022." As there is no evidence of the remaining pendency of the appeal,
Petitioner's motion to vacate the ERAP stay is granted.

Service Requirement for Notices Pursuant to RPL 226c
Respondent moves to dismiss the instant action on the grounds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction because there was no attempt at personal service of the predicate notice. See
Notice of Cross Motion. Specifically, Respondent argues that prior to commencing a holdover
proceeding, the Petitioner is required to serve notices of termination in accordance with the
requirements of RPAPL § 735, CPLR § 2103 (a) and NY Real Prop. Law § 232(a). Id. At ¶

20. Petitioner argues that Respondent is incorrect, as the predicate notice terminating
Respondent's Tenancy was not a "Notice of Termination" pursuant to RPL § 232a, but
instead a "Notice of NonRenewal" pursuant to RPL § 226c, which on its face does not
incorporate the personal service requirement of RPAPL § 735. See Affirmation in Further
Support of Petitioner's Motion and In Opposition to Respondent's CrossMotion to Dismiss
hereinafter "Affirmation in Further Support."
A landlord can elect to terminate a tenancy at the end of a lease term. Notice of such
intent must be provided in order to begin eviction proceedings. See 170 West 85th Street
Tenants Ass'n v. Cruz, 173 AD2d 338, 569 N.Y.S.2d 705, 1991 NY App. Div. LEXIS 7303
("A valid notice of termination is a condition precedent to a summary holdover proceeding.")
The Housing Security and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 "The HSTPA" provides two means
by which a tenancy can be terminated, Section 226c and Section 232a.
Section 226c was an addition to the Real Property Law ("RPL") and reads in pertinent
part,
Notice of rent increase or nonrenewal of residential tenancy. 1. (a) Whenever a
landlord does not intend to renew the tenancy, the landlord shall provide written
notice as required in subdivision two of this section. If the landlord fails to provide
timely notice, the occupant's lawful tenancy shall continue under the existing terms
of the tenancy from the date on which the landlord gave actual written notice until
the notice period has expired, notwithstanding any provision of a lease or other
tenancy agreement to the contrary.[FN1]
Section 232a modifies already existing RPL Section 232a and reads in pertinent part:
Notice to terminate monthly tenancy or tenancy from month to month in the city of
New York. No monthly tenant, or tenant from month to month, shall hereafter be
removed [*3]from any lands or buildings in the city of New York on the grounds
of holding over the tenant's terms unless pursuant to the notice period require by
subdivision two of section two hundred twentysixc of this article, the landlord or
the landlord's agent serve upon the tenant, in the same manner in which a notice
of petition in summary proceedings is now allowed to be served by law, a notice
in writing to the effect that the landlord elects to terminate the tenancy . . . .
Emphasis added.
Though often read together, 226c and 232a are not necessarily meant to be
conjunctive. 226c speaks to the termination of a tenancy at the end of a lease term, whereas
232a is explicit that it applies to the termination of a monthtomonth tenancy. Furthermore,
though it is an addition to the RPL, 226c is silent as to the service requirements of the

notices, whereas 232a is explicit that notices must be served "in the same manner in which a
notice of petition in summary proceedings is now allowed to be served by law", essentially
incorporating RPAPL § 735's mandate of personal service. This silence, coupled with the
distinction between the two tenancies at the time of termination, lead this court to find that
the requirements of RPAPL § 735 are not triggered here. See Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36
NY2d 526, 530, 330 NE2d 615, 369 NYS2d 655 (1975) (when different terms are used in
various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is
intended). See also McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74.
It is well settled that a landlord and tenant may, by the terms of their lease, agree to a
specific manner of service of notices, and that those terms are generally enforceable. See
Miller v. MMT Corp., 182 Misc 2d 670, 700 N.Y.S.2d 388, 1999 N.Y.Misc. LEXIS 518,
citing Chumley's Bar & Rest. Corp. v. Bedford Ct. Assocs., 174 AD2s 398, 400 (1st Dept
1991); Milltown Park v. American Felt & Filter Co., 180 AD2d 235 (3d Dept1992); et al.
Since the face of 226c is silent on the issue of service of the termination notice, if a landlord
opts to serve a 226c notice of termination at the end of a written lease, we must look to the
terms of the lease for guidance around service.
Here, the 90 Day Notice of Intent not to Renew Tenancy Pursuant to Real Property Law
§226c ("90 Day Notice") was dated August 24, 2021 and states that the tenancy was set to
expire on November 30, 2021. See Petition. There is an "Affidavit of service by Mail" which
states that on August 24, 2021 the 90 Day Notice was served "by regular mail (with a
certificate of mailing), certified mail and certified mail, return receipt requested by giving the
same in a postpad, properly addressed envelope " Id. This notice was served in accordance
with Paragraph seventeen (17) of the lease which states that notices served from the landlord
to the tenant shall be served by certified mail. See Affirmation in Further Support at Exhibit
1, Lease. As such, the notice was properly served.
For the forgoing reasons, Respondent's crossmotion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.
Petitioner's motion to Restore is granted.
The foregoing is the Decision/Order of this court.
Dated: October 12, 2022
Brooklyn, New York
HON. TASHANNA B. GOLDEN
JUDGE, HOUSING COURT
Footnotes

Footnote l:Subdivision two outlines the notice requirement based on the length of the
tenancy, with 30, 60, and 90 day mandates.
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